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The University And The Liberty
Of Its Students--A Fiduciary Theory
By ALVIN L. GOLDMAN*
"At the root of all liberty is the liberty to learn." Lord Acton
I
INTRODUCTION
The disciplinary power of a university' is a force *hich every
student has cause to fear. The exercise, or threat of exercise, of a
school's disciplinary power is felt- in every area of campus life.
Invocation of disciplinary sanctions against a student whose per-
sonal conduct or attitudes contravene standards dear to the school
authorities has occurred in such ludicrous cases as the failure of
a co-ed to be a "typical Syracuse girl."'2 In another case, a student
was expelled because she refused to pay purported debts which
she asserted were properly her husband's obligations.3 As insidious
as it may be to impose sanctions in such situations, it is in the area
of student expression and association that the university's dis-
ciplinary power poses its greatest potential threat to society, to
the university itself and possibly to the individual student.
In a typical situation demonstrating the menace inherent in
the university's disciplinary power, a group of students planned
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. The initial research
for this article was done under the auspices of the New York University
Hay's Civil Liberties Program. The author acknowledges his debt to Professor
Norman Dorsen, Director of the Hay's Program, for valuable guidance and criti-
cism in the preparation of earlier drafts of this article. A similar debt is owed to
Lawrence Ross, Esq. and William Nelson Esq. for their helpful editorial -
gestions and to McChord Carrico, research assistant in the preparation of sthis
article.
'The terms "university" and "school" are used interchangeably through-
out this article to denote any institution awarding accredited degrees of bac-
calaureate level or higher.2 Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435
(1928).3 White v. Portia Law School, 274 Mass. 162, 174 N.E. 187 (1931),
cert. denied, 288 U.S. 611 (1932).
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to march in demonstration against the practice of racial segrega-
tion in southern colleges. Acknowledging the students' right to
express their views in peaceful assembly, no obstacles were posed
by local police authorities. Instead, the students were told by their
university's spokesman: "My judgment is better than yours and
I am substituting my judgment for yours and I say that there will
be no march. Furthermore, if there is a march, anyone partici-
pating... will be expelled." This incident took place not in the
deep South, but in upstate New York.4 In another case, four stu-
dents were suspended indefinitely for publishing, in an off-
campus magazine, an article which, though admittedly not ob-
scene, was found by a committee of administrative personnel to
be "generally objectionable." 5
On many campuses representatives of unpopular political
philosophies are prohibited from addressing student groups,6 but
the problem goes even deeper. One of the nation's leading uni-
versities, for example, has confined the use of a course book on
Soviet diplomatic policy to students enrolled in a course in which
the "corrective influence" of a professor may be brought to
bear.7 Such a prohibition carries, of course, an implicit threat of
disciplinary action against violators.
Further, on many occasions students have been disciplined for
criticizing school authorities." Censorship techniques of various
sorts are often imposed on student publications, both on campus
and off.9
From time to time, students have looked to the courts for re-
lief from various alleged abuses of the exercise of a university's
4 Confidential letter on file at the office of the American Civil Liberties
Union (hereinafter referred to as ACLU) New York City. See also, ACLU,
Civil Liberties, Nov. 1963, p. 4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1962, p. 7, col. 3.5 Western Kentucky State College (now Western Kentucky State Uni-
"versity) Dec. 2, 1965, reported in Louisville Courier-Journal, Dec. 5, 1965.6 See, e.g., N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, Report on Campus Censorship
(1962) (survey); N.Y. Times, July 14, 1963, § 1, p. 26, col. 6 (end of 12
year ban at Univ. of Cal., Berkeley); N.Y. Times, June 28, 1963, p. 11, col.
2 (Univ. of North Carolina); Queens College Phoenix, Dec. 18, 1962, P. 6; id.,
Feb. 13, 1963, p. 12. See also, Fidler, Academic Freedom in the South Today,
52 A.A.U.P. Bull. 413, 418 (1966) and Pollitt, Campus Censorship, 42 N.C.L.
Rev. 179 (1963).
72 Rashba, Materials Relating to Soviet Doctrine and Practices in In-
ternational Law at Forword (1959) (N.Y.U. School of Law Library).8Lyncbburg College Magazine, Jan.-Feb. 1961, p. 15; U.S. Nat'1 Stu-
dent Assn, Codification of Policy 78 (1960-61).9 University of Delaware Dean of Students, Supervision and Control of Stu-
dent Publications (1961).
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disciplinary power. The result has been the development of a
small body of case law dealing with student-university problems.
Generally this body of law fails to acknowledge or protect signi-
ficant student interests.10 Recently, however, legal writers have
begun to take note of the law of student-university conflicts and
to recognize that many student interests, both substantive and
procedural, merit protection from a university's disciplinary
power.'1 This article will explore one avenue of granting such
protection-that of recognizing the university as a fiduciary for its
students.
II
FUNCTION OF FREE INqUIRYJ EXPREssION
AND ASSOCIATION IN THE UNIVERSITY
To properly analyze the legal principles applicable to student-
university controversies, especially those affecting freedom of ex-
pression and association, it is necessary to recognize the role of the
student and of expression and association in university life.
Higher education is most often described as an effort to expose
the student to the tools of inquiry so that he may better under-
stand our society and be equipped- to play an active role in it.12
10 See pp. 647-65 infra. Also Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and
the Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities, 2 Law in Transition 1, 2
(1965).
"1Johnson, The Constitutional Rights of College Students, 42 Texas L.
Rev. 344 (1964); Monypenny, Toward a Standard for Student Academic
Freedom, 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 625 (1963); Pollitt, Campus Censor-
ship, 42 N.C.L. Rev. 179 (1963); Symposium: Student Rights and Campus
Rules, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1966); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and
State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 368 (1963); Van Alstyne,
Political Speakers at Universities, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 328 (1963); Note,
Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 983
(1963)- Note 88 Notre Dame Law. 174 (1962); Note, College Disciplinary
Proceedings, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 819 (1965); Note, Private Government on the
Campus, 72 Yale L.J. 1362 (1963).
For a less recent article of great value see Seavey, Dismissal of Students:
Due Process, 70 Har'. L. Rev. 1406 (1957), where the thesis of this article,
that student-university conflicts should be treated under the law of fiduciary,
was first suggested.12 Sweezv v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Steier v. New
York State Educ. Commn, 271 F.2d 13, 20 (2d Cir.), affd. 361 U.S. 966
S1959); Egan v. Moore, 20 App. Div. 2d 150-52, 245 N:Y.S:2d 622, 624,
193), afi'd. 14 N.Y.2d 775. 199 NE.2d 842 (1964); ACLU, Academic Frepdom
and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges and Universities 3 (rev. ed. 1963);
(Continued on next page)
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Some educators assert that, to best accomplish this, the student
should be exposed only gradually to intellectual and social free-
dom. These educators would not trust freshmen with the degree
of liberty allowed a senior.'3 Most educators in the United States,
however, do not support this gradualistic view, and many who
do support it acknowledge that by the time one enters college, his
social and intellectual preparation should have matured him so
that he can patricipate freely in an open market of intellectual
controversy. 14
One of the earliest and best descriptions of the American
concept of the university was that of Thomas Jefferson when he
declared: "[Here] we are not afraid to follow truth, wherever it
may lead, nor to tolerate error so long as reason is left free to
combat it."'u In this century, Dr. Robert Hutchins, reflecting an
often. expressed conviction of contemporary educators, has declared
that freedom of inquiry, discussion and teaching are essential to
a university's existence.' 6 Indeed, this freedom is as vital to the
survival of popular government as it is to the existence of an
institution qualifying for the descriptive title of college or
university.'7
Ideally, the university community should mirror our free so-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
American Association of University Professors (hereinafter referred to as
A.A.U.P.), Tentative Statement on the Academic Freedom of Students, 51
A.A.U.P. Bull. 447 (1966); Centre College of Kentucky, Bulletin 1964-1965,
at 5; Notre Dame, Bulletin of College of Arts and Letters 1964-1965, at 22;
University of Cincinnati, Bulletin for the McMicken College of Arts and
Sciences 1964, at IX; University of Michigan, Bulletin of College of Literature,
Science and the Arts 1964, at 27; University of Notre Dame, General Bul-
letin 1964-1965, at 61 (quoting Cardinal Newman); Upland College, Bulletin
1964-1965, at 7; Yeshiva University, Bulletin 1964-1965, at 4.
'
3 Williamson, Student Personnel Workers' Responsibility for Students"
Expression on Social Issues, XL Personnel and Guidance Journal 123, 126
(Oct. 1961).
14 Egan v. Moore; Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'n and AAUP; all
supra note 12; Admin. Council, City Univ. of N.Y., The Use of the Campuses
of the City Univ. at 1 (1961); Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations
Not for Profit, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993, 1027 (1930); Fellman, Academic Free-
dom in American Law, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 3, 7 n.20; Monypenny, Toward a
Standard for Student Academic Freedom, 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 625,
626-29 (1963); Stevenson, Liberal Means Free, 3 Rights, April, 1956 at 8;
Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of
Public Universities, 2 Law in Transition 1, 8-12 (1965).
157 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 196 (1861).
16Annals, Nov. 1938 at 302.
17See, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 262-64 (1957);
Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1962); Cowan,
Interference With Academic Freedom, 4 Wayne L. Rev. 205 (1958); Linde,
Campus Law, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 40, 41 n.2 (1966).
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ciety's intellectual way of life. Since that way of life is con-
troversy, the student cannot prepare for it by being shielded from
controversy. As the 1947 President's Commission on Higher
Education reported:
[Iintegration of democratic principles into the active life
of a person and a people is not to be achieved merely by
studying or discussing democracy. Classroom teaching of
American tradition, however excellent, will not weave its
spirit into the innermost fiber of the students. Experience in
the give and take of free men in a free society is equally
necessary. Democracy must be lived to be understood .... "I
Members of the Supreme Court have had occasion to make
similar observations. Justice Frankfurter spoke of "the special
task of teachers to foster those habits of open-mindedness and
critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens."' 9
The tentative Statement on The Academic Freedom of Stu-
dents being considered by the American Association of Uni-
versity Professors is an affirmation of the philosophy that the
university's role is to foster intellectual controversy and be an
exemplar of open-mindedness and fairness.20 This concept, though
generally supported in theory, has not always been reflected in
the manner and causes for which universities have exercised their
disciplinary power.
III
PRESENT CASE LAW
A. Doctrinal Mode for Adjudicating Student- University Cases
Although abuses of university power are often suffered in
silence, some have been carried to the courts. In the courts, results
have seldom been favorable to students, particularly in those
cases involving private schools. Acts of state universities are said
18 1 Report of President's Comm'n on Higher Educ., Higher Education
for Democracy: Establishing Goals, 14 (1947). Also: "[T]he very style of life
that a university embodies is itself an education in freedom. What could be
better training for democracy than the spectacle of agile minds cblliding in the
free search for knowledge." Moos & Rourke, The Campus and the State 317(1959). "[Students) must learn to value [democratic ideals] through the
exercise of their own intelligence and through the example of democratic
(Continued on next page)
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to be subject to more stringent judicial scrutiny than those of
private universities, and a remedy available against a public
university sometimes is not available against a private one.21
Many courts grant private universities the benefit of a pre-
sumption that the school acted for meritorious reasons and by
means of a fair procedure, 22 but deal with public university cases
without expressly applying such presumptions. This dual standard
is a tacit acknowledgment by the bench that in many rulings in-
volving privately operated universities it has failed to apply stand-
ards of fair conduct worthy of those imposed upon the states and
their instrumentalities by the fourteenth amendment.
1. Constitutional Approach. - The role of the fourteenth
amendment in protecting students in state operated universities
has been emphasized in several recent cases. Dixon v. Alabama
State Board of Education,23 for example, involved an attempt
by the state education board to expel Negro students for
activities connected with sit-ins and protest marches. The school
authorities had contended that the students' conduct manifested
disloyalty to the school, disrupted its decorum, damaged its
reputation, and made the continued relationship with its of-
ficials difficult and unpleasant. Avoiding these substantive issues,
the court ordered the students reinstated on the ground that they
had not been afforded the due notice and fair hearing required
by the fourteenth amendment. Minimal procedural requirements
vary with the circumstances from case to case, said the court, and
will differ according to the competing interests and the environ-
ment in which the disciplinary action is taken. In this particular
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
principle in action." Taylor, On Education and Freedom 243 (1954).19 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-7 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Also, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). InSweezy v. New Hampshire, note 17, .supra, and Barrenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959), the Court stated that freedom to learn is con-
stitutionally protected.
2051 A.A.U.P. Bull. 447 (1966).
21People ex rel. Tinkoff v. Northwestern Univ., 33 IlM. App. 224, 77
N.E.2d 156 (1947); Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204,
206 (1913); McGinnis v. Walker, 40 N.E.2d 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).22 E.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (dicta); Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88
Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) (en banc); Matter of Swan, 11 App. Div. 2d 670,
204 N.Y.S.2d 77, (1960).
23294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Comment,
60 Mich. L. Rev. 499 (1962); Comment, 35 Temp. L.Q. 437 (1962).
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case, the court found that the charges were so subject to colora-
tion as to require that prior to the hearing the students at least
receive a report of the evidence and a list of witnesses testifying
against them and that they be given an opportunity to present
evidence and argue their defense.24
Substantive protections secured by the fourteenth amendment
have, of course, been invoked for the benefit of students in the
famous flag salute,25 school segregation 26 and prayer 27 cases. Al-
though the amendment's equal protection and due process clauses
probably do not give a student the right to redress simply be-
cause the school has not imposed the same sanctions on other
students committing the identical offense,28 the amendment re-
quires state university officials to be impartial in their dealings
with students. 29
24 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Edue., supra note 23, at 158-59; See
-also Due v. Florida A. & M. Umv., 2 33 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963); West
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Connelly v. Univ. of
Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1956); In re Carter, 262 N.C. 360, 137
S.E.2d 150 (1964); Schiff v. Hannah, Civil No. 4157 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 14, 1965).25West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).26 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ. of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 197
F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
21 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vi-
tale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, supra note 17, at 250, 262-64; Egan v. Moore, 20 App. Div. 2d
150, 245 N.Y.S.2d 622, aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 775, 199 N.E.2d 842 (1964);
Waugh v. Mississippi, 237 U.S. 589 (1915). In Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ.,
supra note 24, at 403, the Court expressly avoided deciding the substantive
issue because the administrative process had not been exhausted.
The Standing Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar As-
sociation in 1962 issued, as Part H of its Annual Report, an opinion stating that
the 14th amendment does not prevent public universities from banning com-
munist speakers from their campuses. Despite the august body issuing this
opinion, its authoritative legal value is highly questionable The opinion offers
neither rationale nor precedent for the position taken. It cites but one
authority, Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. I
(1961), but that case has no direct bearing on the issue under discussion. In-
deed, the rather awkward and often careless composition of Part I- of the
Report indicates that it was a hastily drafted, lightly considered piece of off-
the-cuff advice which ill becomes the work product of any lawyer, let alone a
permanent committee of the A.B.A. For a formal reply to the Committee'sposition, see Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities, 111 U. Pa.
L0Rev. 328 (1963). Also, Pollitt, Campus Censorship, 42 N.C.L. Rev. 179
(1963).28 Frank v. Marquette Univ., 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932).29 Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 21, 22 (2d Cir.
1959) (concurring and dissenting opinions). See, Yick Wo.-v. 'Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373-4 (1886); East Coast Lumber Term. v. Town of Babylon, 174
F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1949); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div.
2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp.
174, 181-82 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (by implication).
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Many persuasive reasons can be asserted for applying the
fourteenth amendment to private as well as state supported
schools. When private property is used in a manner which sub-
stantially affects the community at large, it is clothed with a
public interest and comes within the scope of the fourteenth
amendment.30 Private universities require state license or charter,
generally receiving special tax treatment and unquestionably per-
form an essential public service. It requires no great expansion of
accepted concepts of constitutional law to find that the guarantees
secured by the fourteenth amendment are applicable in measuring
the legality of the conduct of a private university.31 Thus, one
judge recently observed that: "[A]dministrators of a private college
... do the work of the state, often in place of the state. Does it not
follow that they stand in the state's shoes? And, if so, are they
not then agents of the state, subject to the constitutional re-
straints on government action to the same extent as private persons
who govern a company town?' 32
2. Loco Parentis Theory. - A broad regulatory and disi-
plinary power over its student body was ascribed to the uni-
versity in some early cases on the ground that "college authorities
stand in loco parentis concerning the physical, moral and mental
training of the pupils."3 3 The loco parentis characterization of the
student-university affiliation is very questionable and has fallen
into disuse. It does not explain the school's power to regulate stu-
dent conduct when the student acts with his parent's consent,3 4
30 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 181 (1961), concurring opinion
quoting with approval Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
31 See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 86 S.Ct. 486 (1966); Burton v. Will-
mington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4
(1958); Terry v. Alabama, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Public Utilities Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946);
Johnson, The Constitutional Rights of College Students, 42 Texas L. Rev.
344 (1964); Note, Private Government on Campus, 72 Yale Lj., 1362, 1382-
1386 (1963); Comment, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 746, 749 n.22 (1958).3 2 Guillory v. Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 859 (E.D. La. 1962).
Also, Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951, (5th Cir. 1965). See
generally, Taylor, On Education and Freedom at 86 (1954). Cf. Bomar v.
Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947); Fellman,
Academic Freedom in American Law, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 3, 46.3 3 E.g., Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) (en
bane); Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913); 18 Tenn.
L. Rev. 210, 211 (1944).3 4 E.g., United States ex rel. Gannon v. Georgetown College, 28 App.
D.C. 87 (1906) (student expelled for absence at father's request) and Curry
v. Lasell Seminary Co., 168 Mass. 7, 46 N.E. 110 (1897) (stlident expelled for
(Continued on next page)
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nor does it explain the basis of authority over an emancipated
pupil or one who has reached majority..35 Finally, it has been noted
that a parent may not lawfully do the very act which the uni-
versity frequently tries to accomplish in asserting its purported
loco parentis authority-sever all ties.58
3. Trust Theory. - Two cases, which apparently stand
alone, contain dicta to the effect that the nature of the student-
university affiliation is one of trust. One case suggesting this theory
involved the refusal of the Illinois Supreme Court to grant
mandamus to a petitioner seeking entrance to a university. The
court suggested that once enrolled, the student would stand as
the beneficiary of the trustee-university.37 Similarly, the trial court
in Anthony v. Syracuse3s characterized the disciplined student as
the beneficiary of a trust.
4. Contractual Approach. - Operating under the assumption
that constitutional guarantees are inapplicable to student-uni-
versity conflicts, the courts usually look to contract law to
rationalize decisions in suits involving such conflicts. The
bench generally assumes that the provisions of the student-
university contract are to be found in all of the statements
contained in the admissions application, the registration form, the
school's rules and regulations and the catalogue. 39 The rather
obvious questions to be raised to this approach under the Statute
of Frauds40 and the parol evidence rule are ignored in the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
visiting parents on Sunday). See Van Astyne, Student Academic Freedom
and the Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities, 2 Law in Transition 1,
17-18 (1965); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University
Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 368, 375-378 (1963); Note, Private Government
on Campus, 72 Yale L.J. 1362, 1371 (1963).
35 Blackwell, College Law at 101 (1961); Van Alstyne, supra note 34;
Note, supra note 34, at 1380.
36 Note, supra note 34, at 1380. Although the loco parentis theory is
inapplicable in student-university cases, the fact that courts have on occasion
turned to this concept for guidance suggests acknowledgement by the bench
that these disputes involve the law of status, not the law of contract. See pp.
679-80, infra.
37 People ex rel. Tinkoff v. Northwestern Univ., 33 I1. App. 224, 77
N.E.2d 345, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 829 (1947).38130 Misc. 249, 223 N.Y. Supp. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1927), rev'd, 224, App.
Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928).39 Robinson v. Univ. of Miami, 100 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1958); Barker v.
Bryn Mawr College Trustees, 1 Pa. D. & C. 383 (Dist. Ct.- 1922), aff'd per
curlam, 278 Pa. 121, 122 Ad. 220 (1923); Note, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 898,
899 (1935); Note, 1962 11. L. Forum 438; Comment, 43 N.C.L. Rev. 152,
153 (1964). (Continued on next page)
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decisions, possibly because the litigants fail to raise them.41
Included somewhere in the catalogue or registration form of
most universities is a statement that the school reserves the power
to cancel a student's registration, refuse to award academic credits,
or deny a certificate or degree without having to state a reason
for its action.42 The courts generally focus on this purported
grant of power, uphold it, and indeed give it broad construction.
A leading case involving the enforcement of such a clause is
Anthony v. Syracuse University.43 In that case the registration
agreement stated that the school reserved a "right to require
withdrawal of any student at any time for any reason deemed suf-
ficient to it and no reason for requiring such withdrawal need be
given." A co-ed was accordingly dismissed on the grounds that
she was not "a typical Syracuse girl." Apparently some of Miss
Anthony's sorority sisters had, at one time, complained about her
and "rumors" had circulated concerning her. Details concerning
the complaints and rumors are not discussed by the court. Despite
the impenetrable vagueness of the reason given for the school's
action, it was upheld on the grounds that Miss Anthony was
absolutely bound by the registration agreement. Many other cases
have followed the Anthony rationale" and a random survey of
university catalogues reveals that the schools have been diligent
in adopting these self-serving statements. 45
The law of contracts is not, however an appropriate basis for
(Footnote continued from preceding page)40 Since the provision ot a university education generally entails a period
of performance in excess of one year, under the usual Statute of Frauds, all
of the material terms of the contract must be in a writing signed by the party
against whom it is to be enforced.41 See, e.g., brief of plaintiff to N.Y. Court of Appeals in Carr v. St. John's
Univ., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 236 N.Y.S.2d 834, 187 N.E.2d 18 (1962). It is not
insignificant that often these cases are litigated by the student without counsel.
See, e.g., Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'n, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.),
aff'd mem. 361 U.S. 966 (1959)4 2 E.g., Abilene Christian College, Bulletin 1964-1965, at 26; Adelphi
Univ., Bulletin 1964-1965, at 27; Antioch College, Bulletin 1964-1965, at 39-
40; Baker Univ., Bulletin at 16 (1965); U.C.L.A. Bulletin 1965-1966, at 55;
Univ. of Cincinnati, Bulletin at XIV (1964); Univ. of Notre Dame, General
Bulletin 1964-65, at 74.
43 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928).44 See, e.g., Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957)
(school refused to renew the registration of a student who had protested against
the inadequacy of scholarship assistance); Robinson v. Univ. of Miami, supra
note 39 (dismissed student from teacher training progam because he was an
atheist); Carr v. St. John's Univ., supra note 41 (students expelled for partici-
pating in a civil marriage ceremony).45 Supra note 42.
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deciding student-university disputes. Contract rules were develop-
ed to deal with the hard bargains made by self-interested persons
operating in a commercial setting.40 The environment in which a
student deals with a university is far removed from the market
place and it is unwise, therefore, to judge student-university con-
flicts by the law of the market. Moreover, to the extent that courts
have insisted on deciding these cases under contract doctrine, they
have neglected to apply the multitude of devices developed by the
bench in recognition of the fact that the further a bargain is
removed from the environment of the open market, the more
sensitive courts should be to the demands of fair and honest con-
duct.47
In registering or applying for admission, the student is con-
cerned with the details of entrance and degree reguirements, not
with protections against the autocratic imposition of disciplinary
measures. It is unreasonable to bind him to terms set forth in the
middle of a lengthy catalogue or in the fine print of a registration
card which was executed together with course cards, bursar's
receipts, student directory forms and the like. The restrictions in
choice of school imposed on most entering students by financial
limitations, entrance requirements and geographic location plus
the added barriers to transferring to a new school, place the stu-
dent in a weak bargaining position. Moreover, the registration
contract is not a result of bargaining. It is unlikely that a student
wishing to re-negotiate its terms would be able to find someone
during the registration period who had the authority to vary the
provisions of the contract. His contract with the university is
46Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. R1ev. 553, 562-65 (1933);
Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 253, 266
266 (1947); Friedmann, Changing Functions of Contract in Common Law, 9 U.
Toronto L.J. 15, 19-22 (1951); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 640-42 (1943).47 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furn. Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (unconscionable contracts) Harrison & Sons, Inc. v. J. J. Case
Co., 180 F. Supp. 243, 254 (E.D.S.C. 1960) (use of constructive conditions to
rewrite contracts); Jessel v. Lockwood Textile Corp., 276 App. Div. 378 (N.Y.
1950) (per curiam) (contractual term unreasonable and therefore unenforceable);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942) (dicta) (un-
conscionable terms can be held unenforceable); Cf., West Coast Hotel v.- Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 393 (1937); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366,.397 (1897). See
generally, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-202 comment 1, § 2-302; Corbin, Con-
tracts §§ 62r-632 (1950); Dawson, supra note 46; Kessler, supra note 46; Llewel-
lrn. What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 731-3431)
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surely a contract of adhesion, and hence should not be given
literal effect in enforcing it against him. 48
In 1895 the Kansas City Court of Appeals held that a student
who registers for a new semester is on unequal footing with the
university and enters into the registration contract under duress.49
In that case a law student enrolled in the defendant law school
when tuition for the second year was $40. Prior to the pupil's
registration for his second year of studies, the law school raised
the second year tuition to $50. The complaining student paid the
extra $10 under protest and the court, commenting that schools
are required to deal fairly and in good faith with their students,
held that he was entitled to a refund. The law school could not
take advantage of the student's compelling circumstances when
he enrolled for a second year.50 Many commentators have simi-
larly urged that because a university is expected to deal fairly
with its student body and, because it holds the upper hand in
negotiating (or, more precisely, setting) the terms of enrollment,
the bench should not enforce contractual reservations without
requiring a showing by the school of compelling cause for in-
voking sanctions and a fair fact finding procedure.51
B. Role of Judicial Restraint
Regardless of the type of rationale employed by the courts
in deciding these cases, the overall impact of adjudication in stu-
dent-university controversies has been characterized by judicial
reluctance to interfere with the action of the university. Now
and then the courts give expression to the presence of this de-
ferential attitude. In some cases there is an obvious need for such
deference to the university's judgment, but in others it is unjusti-
fiable.
Two categories of student-university disputes which obviously
warrant great deference to the university's expertise are: (a)
4 8 Note, Private Govemment on the Campus, 72 Yale L.J. 1362, 1377-79
(1963); note 47, supra.49 Niedermeyer v. Curators of State Univ., 61 Mo. App. 654 (Kan. City
Ct App. 1895).
50 Ibid.
51 E-g, Note, Private Goverment on the Campus, 72 Yale L.J. 1362 (1963);
Comment, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 746 (1958). Cf., Note, Judicial Conrol of Actions of
Private Associations, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 983 (1983); Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1164 (1962).
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those involving the application of academic standards of per-
formance, and (b) those involving the design of a curriculum.
For example, in one case a doctoral candidate who was dismissed
from Columbia University because he refused to revise his re-
jected dissertation brought an action for reinstatement and lost.
The New York court held that the university asserted bona fide
reasons for insisting on revision of the dissertation and properly
explained that the bench cannot attempt to substitute its opinion
of the merits of the work for that of the educators.52 In another
New York case the court held that it could not order the rein-
statement of a pupil expelled for academic reasons because the
bench cannot compose a competent examination to test the ac-
curacy of the school's evaluation of the merits of a student's
work.53 On the other hand, there are boundaries to such deference
to expertise in academic matters. For example, a California court
has ruled that a pupil dismissed for lack of mental competence
must be reinstated where the school has offered no concrete
evidence of its assertion and the pupil has passed all of his exami-
nations."4
1. Impact of Judicial Deference to University Disciplinary
Decisions-The judiciary has not confined its deference toward the
educator's ability to weight the merits of a dismissal to situations
involving questions of academic performance. Courts have stated
that they are loath to interfere with a school's exercise of control
over campus discipline. 5 One judge has said that the court can
no more control a college's disciplinary actions than "control the
domestic discipline of a father in his family." 56 An early observer
commented, "They [educators] know more about [the methods
of instruction, testing, study and recreation of students] ... than
the courts or anyone else. Their habits of thought, study, and
52 Edde v. Columbia Univ., 8 Misc. 2d 795 168 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1957), afd mer., 5 N.Y.2d 777, 154 N.E.Fl 558, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 956
(1959).53People ex rel. Pacilla v. Bennett Medical College, 205 III. App. 324 (1917);
People ex rel. Jones v. New York Homeopathic" Medical College, 20 N.Y. Supp.
379 (Super. Ct. 1892).
54 Miller v. Dailery, 136 Cal. 212, 68 Pac. 1029 (1902).55 Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 248, 197 S.W. 510; 514 (1924);
E.g., State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 105, 171 S.W.2d 822, 827,
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1942); Note, 50 Geo. L.J. 314, 318 (1961); Note,
43 N.C.L. Rev. 152, 154 (1964).
56 People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Il. 186, 187 (1866).
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life better fit them for the exercise of correct judgment than
others, and, except in clear cases of abuse of discretion, courts
should keep their hands off."157 Judge Cameron of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, dissenting in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education58 said that the courts know very little about the ethical
and practical considerations of student discipline and that juducial
intervention in students rights cases will "add to the now crushing
responsibilities of federal functionaries, the necessity of qualifying
as a Gargantuan aggregation of wet nurses or baby sitters."59
The impact of this attitude of judicial restraint in these cases
is reflected in the development of the procedural and substantive
rules. For example, courts generally presume that a school's dis-
ciplinary determination is meritorious, resulting from an adequate
process of decision making. The student has the burden of
proving that it was otherwise.60 This presumption is occassionally
expressed in terms of the bench's reluctance to find that uni-
versity officials abused their discretion.6' A few courts say that if
the school authorities made an honest effort to determine what
action is in the school's best interests, then "the wisdom or un-
wisdom of their conclusion is not for us to consider." 62 The case
law in Kentucky63 restricts judicial relief to situations in which the
rules or aims of that action are unlawful or against public policy.6
A federal court has found that under New York law, the Board
of Education has final authority to decide student rights cases
and the court is therefore without power to interfere unless the
administrative decision is arbitrary or "palpably illegal." 65
Although a few courts have held that the university's exercise
57 Harker, The Use of Mandamus to Compel Educational Institutions to
Confer Degrees, 20 Yale L.J. 341, 352 (1911). Harker was dean of the University
of Illinois College of Law.
58 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
59 Id. at 160.60 Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) (en bane); Mat-
ter of Swan, supra note 22.
61 Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913), Anthony v.
Syracuse, 224 App. Div. 331 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928).
62 Saeex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 206, 263 Pac. 433, 438
(1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928).63 Statutory provisions such as Ky. Rev. Stat (hereinafter referred to as
KRS) § 164.370 appear to place greater limitations on the disciplinary powers
of public universities than are imposed on private ones by existing case law in
this jurisdiction.64 Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 378, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913).65 Steier v. New York State Educ. Commr, 161 F. Supp. 549 (E.D.N.Y.
1958), aff'd menm., 361 U.S. 966 (1959).
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of disciplinary discretion is subject to the test of reasonableness, 0
others have emphasized that an error in judgment is not grounds
for granting relief to the student. 7 At least two courts have said
that the bench cannot weigh the merits of the school's exercise
of discretion at all.6s
Private schools are generally held to have the power to con-
tractually waive the requirement of providing the student with a
notice of the cause for disciplinary action or an opportunity to be
heara with regard to the imposition of such sanctions.0 9 On the
other hand, publicly supported universities are generally required
to give a student notice of the charges against him prior to ex-
pulsion.70 An Illinois court has ruled that the notice requirement
was satisfied where a student was first apprised of the charges
against her when she appeared before the school's Committee on
Policy and Discipline more than a year after she was suspended. 7'
Prior to dismissal for misconduct from a state college, the
student is also generally held to have a right to some sort of
hearing.72 A few states have enacted this requirement into statute.73
Almost without exception, however, the courts find that the hear-
ing afforded the student was adequate, 74 even though in some cases
it has consisted of nothing more than an opportunity for the stu-
dent to explain his action to an administrative officer. 75 Because
the school does not have power to subpoena witnesses, it has been
66 Note, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 904 (1935).
67E.g., Frank v. Marquette Univ., 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932).
CSDehaan v. Brandeis Univ. 160 F. Supp. 626, 627 (D. Mass. 1957); State
ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433, 438 (1927), cert. denied,
277 U.S. 591 (1928).
69 Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., supra note 68; Note, 38 Notre Dame Law. 174,
178-79 (1962).70 Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 48 Md. 623, 57 Atl. 14 (1904); Note, supra
note 69, at 178.71 People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 IM. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E.2d
635 (IMI. Ct. App. 1956); Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process, 70 Harv.
L. Rev. 1406 (1957).72 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 283 F. Supp. 896
(N.D. Fla. 1963); State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d
822, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1942); King v. Chancellor of the Univ. of
Cambridge, (1724) 92 Eng. Rep. 370 (King's Bench); Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ.,
150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957) (dicta).
73 E.g., KRS § 164.870; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-315 as applied in In re
Carter, 262 N.C. 860, 137 S.E.2d 150 (1964); 58 A.L.R.2d 903, 916 (1958).
7458 A.L.R.2d 903, 909 (1958). See generally, Van Alstyne, Student Aca-
demic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities, 2 Law in
Transition 1, 2-6 (1965).75 E.g., Tanton v. McKenny, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924).
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held that confrontation of witnesses and an opportunity to cross-
examine are not necessary elements of an expulsion hearing.76
And, at least one court has even said that it would unduly burden
a public university to require it to confront the student with the
evidence being used against him.77 Of course, the decision in
Dixon v. Alabama78 suggests that many of the above cases are of
questionable constitutional validity.
Some litigated cases involving student-university conflicts arise
out of situations which undoubtedly warrant disciplinary action
to preserve the academic standards, safety or orderliness of the
institution.79 Even in these cases, however, the sanctions imposed
are occasionally beyond the reasonable demands of the situation.
In many instances rather doubtful causes have been suc-
cessfully asserted as grounds for imposing severe disciplinary
sanctions. For example, where a school's regulations prohibited
such conduct, a court upheld the right of a college to expel a
pupil who visited her parents on Sunday.8° Expulsion of students
who ate off campus in violation of university regulations was
upheld in Kentucky as a lawful exercise of disciplinary au-
thority."' Membership in a fraternity has been sustained both as
valid grounds for refusing to admit a student and for suspension
from a university.82 A college for women received judicial ap-
proval when it dismissed a student on the grounds that she had
married. 13 A Maryland decision upheld the dismissal of a young
lady who, with only one other student, declined to join in a "vote
of confidence" in the school. She also refused to tell the college
76 State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1942).
77 People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 nM. App. 2d 207, 134
N.E.2d 635 (1956).
78294 F.2d 150, 155-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
Accord, Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Due
v. Florida A. & M. Univ., supra note 72.79 Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 8 0, 78 N.Y. Supp. 739 (1902)(accused fellow student of being guilty of petitioners own misconduct); Barker
v. Bryn Mawr College Trustees, 1 Pa. Dist. & Co. 383 (Dist Ct. 1922), aff'd per
curiam, 278 Pa. 121, 122 Atl. 200 (1923) (theft on campus); e.g., Foley v.
Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55 S.W.2d 805 (Comm'n of App. 1932) (academic
standards).
so Curry v. Lasell Seminary Co., 168 Mass. 7, 46 N.E. 110 (1897).
81 Gott v. Berea College. 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913). Contra, Mc-
ginnis v. Walker, 40 N.E.2d 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
8 2 Waugh v. Mississippi Univ., 237 U.S. 589 (1915) (refused admission).
Contra, State ex rel. Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278 (1882); People ex rel. Pratt
v. Wheaton College. 40 IM. 186 (1866).8 3 Hall v. Mt. Ida School for Girls, Inc., 258 Mass. 464, 155 N.E. 418 (1927).
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president whether she reported to local newsmen that male school
officials made improper suggestions to the co-eds8 4
As noted above, expulsion of a female law student for re-
fusing to pay debts which she claimed her separated husband was
obliged to pay as items of support was sustained by the highest
court of Massachusetts. 5 Dismissal for a breach of probation was
upheld in at least one case where the violation consisted of at-
tending an off-campus rally,8 6 and in another case where the of-
fense consisted of publicizing the history of a disciplinary proba-
tion which had been imposed more than a year earlier because
the student had criticized a campus administrative body.8 7
One can only speculate concerning the connection between
the pattern of broadly applied deference shown by the bench in
favor of the determinations of universities in cases involving stu-
dents and the traditional theories employed by the courts to
rationalize and categorize these cases. What is clear, though, is
that just as the propriety and validity of the legal rationales in-
volved is highly questionable, so too is the judiciarys' deferential
attitude open to criticism.
2. The Error of Judicial Deference Toward University Disci-
plinary Actions. - To determine whether the judiciary should
grant relief from a purportedly wrongful act, the seriousness of
the injury suffered ought to be balanced by the undesirability of
interfering with the particular form of conduct which caused the
injury.88 In the situation under discussion, we have on the one
hand, defamation of the expelled or disciplined student's char-
acter, impediments to his ability to complete his education, pos-
sible disabilities placed upon his future earning power, possible
barriers to his entering his chosen field of work, personal humilia-
tion and the injection of the awesome presence of the school's
84 Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 126 Atl. 882 (1924).
85 White v. Portia Law School, 274 Mass. 162, 174 N.E. 187 (1931), cert.
denied, 288 U.S. 611 (1932).8 6 Zarichny v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 18 U.S.L. Week 3014 (Mich. 1949)
(see Petition for Certiorari at 3-5).87 Steier v. New York State Educ. Commr, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.), affd
mem., 361 U.S. 966 (1959).88 Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profi, 43 Harv. L.
Rev. 993, 1008 (1930). Cf., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954);
Van Aistyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public
Universities, 2 Law in Transition 1. 6-12 (1965); Note, Is a College Education
Necessarj?, 31 Miss. L. J. 285 (1960).
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disciplinary power into the environment in which student acti-
vities are conducted. The opposing interests of the university
consist basically of safeguarding its reputation and the reputation
of its student body and preventing impairment of its control of
student conduct necessary to maintain that degree of discipline
which must be maintained if it is to carry out its task of educating.
The University has a sizeable arsenal to protect it from the
harm which any student or group of students can bring upon it.
Generally, it has a respected tradition of community service and
dedication to scholarship. It also has a large corps of able spokes-
men in its alumni, faculty, and trustees. A university normally has
considerable financial resources to aid it in publicizing and legally
defending its position. Also, a university has a large degree of
that insulation from being associated with the individuals within
it which is common to all institutional entities. Prestige, position
and power all add their weight to that which the university ex-
pounds simply because it is a university which is speaking.
The student, on the other hand, is generally too tender in
years and experience to be an effective spokesman for his interests.
He has neither reputation, prestige nor power to add convincing
force to his proclamations of self-righteousness and good conduct.
Often he has no financial resources and seldom any spokesman.
Certainly the relative interests of the parties and their relative
ability to defend those interests indicate that absent judicial
intervention, the student, and the student body, is rather helpless
in resisting the serious injury which may be unjustly imposed
when a college invokes its disciplinary sanctions.
Some institutions by their very nature require a high degree of
autocratic control - a religious group, a fraternal order, a poli-
tical action group.8 9 If an individual is dissatisfied with the in-
ternal operations of such a group he will generally desire to leave
it rather than fight it, and often on leaving he will be able to
join or form a rival or alternative organization. Since each mem-
ber in joining realizes that he must be resigned to abide by the
group's internal discipline and be loyal to that system in order to
achieve the organization's purpose, the wronged member has
little cause to expect judicial aid if the group treats him arbi-
89 Chafee, supra note 88 at 1026.
[Vol. 54,
1966] THE UN ,msrry AND TE LnRTY OF ITs STUDFrs 661
trarily. And, in fact, courts seldom interfere with the internal ac-
tivities of such organizations."
The university in our society should not be an autocratic
organization. 91 "It is doubtful whether the students, parents, and
teachers contemplate such [autocratic] authority as inherent in
the nature of an educational institution."92 There is little doubt
that most educators would contend that university officials do not
seek or desire untrammeled power to stifle nonconforming stu-
dents.93 If, as discussed above, the university is an institution built
on controversy and dedicated to the rigorous exchange of ideas and
clash of concepts in search of truth and understanding, then
surely it has no claim to an institutional need for autocratic
power.
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. once delineated the four areas of in-
quiry which the judiciary must explore in determining whether
to undertake a passive or active role in policing the relationships
of individuals with legally cognizable entities. He called the first
of these the "strangle-hold policy." "Some associations have a
strangle-hold upon their members through their control of an
occupation or property which can ill be spared. In such a situa-
tion there is operative a policy in favor of relief against wrongful
treatment."0 4 While there is dispute as to how overcrowded our
colleges really are, the common practice of even good students
applying to three or four schools in hope of being admitted to
one indicates that the present day university is in a strangle-hold
position.95 Moreover, the student who is dissatisfied with his
present school is discouraged from transferring by the need to
take transfer exams, by the cost of applications, by the likely
prospect of loss of earned credits, additional required courses
and having to adjust to a new social and academic environment
and by the inevitable suspicion of the "real" cause for transfer.
Third and fourth year college students will often find it im-
possible to locate a reputable school which accepts advanced stu-
90 Cbafee, &upra note 88 at 1018.
91 Notes 14-20, 89, supra and accompanying texts.
92 Note 89, supra. Also, Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'n, 271 F.2d
13, 22 n.1 (2d Cir. 1959).93 Notes 18 and 20, supra.94 Chafee, supra note 88, at 1022.95 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1965, p. 73, col. 1; Id., Feb. 22, 1966, p.
25, col. 2.
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dents as transferees; thus, unquestionably placing the school of
initial enrollment in a strangle-hold status in regard to this half or
quarter of the student body. Hence, the school's strangle.hold
over the student should give rise to a policy in favor of relieving
him where he has suffered wrongful treatment at the hands of the
university.
The second area of inquiry defined by Chafee involves what
he called the "dismal swamp policy." When the bench finds that
it is difficult for an outsider to learn the customs and terminology
and understand the rules and regulations governing an area of
controversy, it exercises restraint in. granting relief so as to avoid
getting bogged down in the dismal swamp of the unfamiliar v8
As we have seen, many judges assign as the cause for their un-
willingness to remedy a student's complaint against the university's
exercise of disciplinary power the fear of treading into the
academic swamp.97 In matters of scholastic achievement and
teaching technique this is a valid objection to judicial interference.
Indeed educators themselves acknowledge the quagmire.98 But in
matters of deportment, extracurricular activities and student ex-
pression and association, this position is untenable. Today almost
all jurists are college graduates. Many judges have earned several
degrees and some have spent a large part of their professional
lives as teachers. Their wives, children and friends are often
closely associated with campus life in some capacity. Newspapers,
books, television, radio and motion pictures depict campus activi-
ties for the entertainment or enlightenment of the judicial as
well as the lay audience. Many jurists are active alumni of their
colleges and law schools and not infrequently they are members of
the board of trustees of one or several institutions for higher learn-
ing. The control of youthful conduct has long been within the
realm of judicial power; courts invoke the sanctions of the state
to discipline delinquent youths and the bench has traditionally
been an overseer of the welfare of wards and minors.
Neither the campus nor the disciplining of young people,
96 Chafee, supra note 88. at 1023.9 7 Notes 55-59, supra and accompanying texts.9 8 E.g., Ass'n of Amer. L. Schools, Report of Survey on Teaching Methods
and Types of Examinations Used, 1955 Proceedings 275; Amandes, How We
Examine, 11 J. Legal Ed. 566 (1959); Fulda, An Examination in Comparative
Law, 9 J. Legal Ed. 536, 547 (1957); Comment, 43 N.C.L. Rev. 152, 154 (1964).
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then, is strange territory to the judiciary. And even if it were, Mr.
Justice Jackson, speaking for the United States Supreme Court
in Vest Virginia State Board of Education v. Bernette supplied the
correct answer when he said: "We act in these matters not by
authority of our competence but by force of our commissions. We
cannot because of our modest estimate of our competence in such
specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that
history authenticates as the function of this Court when history
is infringed."'9
Third on Chafee's list of judicial considerations is the "hot
potato policy." This was his short-hand way of observing that
courts avoid making decisions in highly controversial matters.100
This policy is recommended by its pragmatic orientation toward
avoiding the predicament of the executive branch saying "the
court made the decision, let the judges enforce it" and thereby
considerably weakening the authoritative aura so valuable to the
judiciary's effectiveness as an instrument of economic, social and
political stability. To invoke the "hot potato" doctrine in any
but the most extreme case, however, is for the bench to abdicate
its responsibility. Student-university relations do not represent
an area of such great controversial moment that the courts can
rationally exercise restraint out of fear of provoking insurmount-
able political alienations.10 1
Finally, legal supervision should often be withheld for fear
that it may do more harm than good. "This principle of freedom
and growth is easily overlooked by judges."' 0 2 The countervailing
consideration, of course, is that "however venerable, respectable
and beneficial an institution, its continuance may well be
impropitious if it cannot operate under rules of natural justice.' 0 3
In dealing with student-university disputes, the former considera-
tion should prevail in questions of curriculum, testing and class-
room discipline since these problems are quite unique to the
99 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943). Cf., Comment supra note 98, at 155.
100 Chafee, supra note 88, at 1025.
l1 Certainly the steady progress of the courts in applying" the very con-
troversial school desegregation decisions negates any cause for invoking the "hot
potato" doctrine in student-university disputes. See generally, Gellhorn, A Decade
of Desegregation-Retrospect and Prospect, 9 Utah L. Rev. 3, 4 (1964).
102 Chafee, supra note 88, at 1027.
103 Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77, 87 (Com-
mon Pleas 1887).
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educational institution and historically progress in this area has
come from within the institution. On the other hand, questions
of disciplinary procedure and freedom of expression and associa-
tion outside the classroom are proper areas for judicial concern
since they are problems common to the community at large and
often have an impact, sometimes immediate, outside of the
campus complex.
The general restraint of the bench in granting relief to ag-
grieved students might lie in a reluctance of judges to publicly
rebuke esteemed leaders of a university (often products of the
court's own generation) at the request of "young upstarts" who
persist in challenging the values held dear by their elders in the
school administration and the bench. One can only form suspi-
cions regarding the influence of inter-generation rivalry in these
cases. Certainly it is not a judicially cognizable basis for render-
ing decision.
Another reason for the past tradition of judicial restraint in
this area is probably the failure of the bar to recognize that the
pro-university tone of leading cases in the field is, in part, a
result of the fact that the issue often arose in a mandamus pro-
ceeding. 04 Indeed, two of the earliest law review articles on judi-
cial relief from interference with a student's freedom dealt
primarily with the availability of mandamus in these cases.'05 The
early fly-specking habits in reviewing common law writs of
mandamus evolved into a tradition of restraint. Courts generally
would not grant mandamus where there was a chance of its inter-
fering with the exercise of discretion on the part of a group
vested with some power to exercise its own judgment. The peti-
tioner had to persuade the court that the issuance of the writ
would not interfere with the good faith exercise of discretionary
power and that the writ was necessary to relieve a wrong. Further,
in many jurisdictions, the courts completely rejected the use of
mandamus to compel a university official to rescind an admini-
104 Roughly one third of the cases. E.g., People ex rel. Bluett v. Trustees of
Univ. of IM., 10 111. App.2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635 (1956); State ex rel. Dodd v.
Tison, 175 La. 235, 143 So. 59 (1932); Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 126
At. 882 (1924); Tanton v. McKenny, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924).
105 Harker, The Use of Mandamus to Compel Educational Institutions to
Confer Degrees, 20 Yale L.J. 341 (1911); Pennypacker, Mandamus to Restore
Academic Privileges, 12 Va. L. Rev. 645 (1926).
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strative determination. 10 6 As a result of the role mandamus has
played in student-university litigation, it is reasonable to assume
that at least some of the tradition of judicial restraint has it origin
in the form of action rather than the cause of action.
IV
A FIDucIARY THEORY
Recognition of the student-university relationship as one in-
volving fiduciary status provides a much needed springboard from
which to overcome the bench's usual deference to the decisions of
educators in areas outside of the academic domain. Moreover,
the fiduciary approach provides the most accurate doctrinal
rationale for decision in these cases.
As we have seen, under the existing body of case law govern-
ing student-university conflicts the courts have sanctioned auto-
cratic interference with, and suppression of, the intellectual, social
and political liberty of students. Academic freedom has been
undermined and fair process frequently denied. The responsi-
bility for this lies, of course, primarily with university admini-
strators for engaging in such conduct. In addition, faculties, stu-
dents and alumni groups have often been guilty of a callous dis-
regard for the cause of preserving the university as a citadel of
liberty, open-mindedness and critical inquiry. But blame also
lies with the bar for failing to recognize that student-university
conflicts should be resolved by the law of status rather than the
law of contracts.
A. Student-A Status Relationship
"[T]he central idea of our law is relation. We speak of the law
of principal and agent, master and servant, landlord and tenant,
vendor and purchaser, banker and customer and domestic re-
lations."' 0 7 Generally these relations are consensual, arising out of
106 Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Ass'n v. Timmons, 105 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa
1960); Red Star Line, Inc. v. Baughman, 139 Adt. 291, 293 (Md. 1927); Penny-
packer, supra note 105; State ex rel. Scott v. Dobson, 135 P.2d 794, 796 (Ore.
1943).
107 Chafee, supra note 88, at 1007. Pound, in Interpretations of Legal History
at 56-57 (1923), said:
If we must find a fundamental idea in the common law, it is relation,
(Continued on next page)
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some form of contract. Often many of the incidents of a particular
relationship will be specified by the terms of an agreement, but
rarely can sufficient words be used to describe all of the inci-
dents. Indeed, when the relationship is one commonly entered
into, the law can eliminate the need to bargain for, enunciate and
record its numerous peculiar incidents. Instead, they can be fixed
by the law's recognition of common understanding of the nature
of the relationship. In such situations, its contractual aspects be-
come secondary in legal significance to the fixed incidents of the
status.108 Courts will sometimes even disregard parts of an express
agreement of the parties if its is inconsistent with common under-
standing of the purpose and function of the resulting status of the
parties. For example, a common carrier is not permitted to limit
its liability unless it offers at least one tariff to the shipper under
which the carrier is absolutely liable.109 Nor will the courts per-
mit an employer to contractually disaffirm his vicarious liability;
he must, instead, enter into a different form of relationship, that
of principal and independent contractor.110
Although the incidents of the student-university relationship
lack the sort of specificity and consistency found in a relationship
such as admihistrator-distributee, this does not detract from the
validity of recognizing it as a legal status. Many relationships
governed by the law of status, such as master and servant or
director and shareholder, are broadly conceived arrangements
carrying a wide range of contractually varied secondary aspects
within the framework of the basic incidents of the relationship."'
The student-university relationship, clearly, is more than a
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
not will. If the Romanist sees all problems in terms of the will of an
actor and of the logical implications of what he has willed and done, the
common-law lawyer sees almost all problems-all those, indeed, in
which he was not led to adopt the Romanist's point of view in the last
century-in terms of a relation and of incidents in the way of reciprocal
rights and duties involved in or required to give effect to that relation.
* . . On every side we think not of transactions, but of relations.
108 Chafee, supra note 88, at 1007; Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv.
L. Rev. 553, 554-55, 558 (1933)...
109 E.g., Straus & Co. v. Canadian Paa. Ry., 254 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564
(1930).
110 E, compare Sauter v. New York Tribune, 305 N.Y. 442, 113 N.E.2d
790 (1953) with Gliehmi v. Dairy Co., 254 N.Y. 60, 171 N.E. 906 (1930).
111 See, Cohen, supra note 108, at 569-70, 585-92. See generally, e.g., Re-
statement (Second), Agency §§ 230, 245, 248, 250, 251 (1959); Ballantine,
Corporations §§ 62, 63, 66 (Rev. ed. 1946); Henn, Corporations § 215 (1961);
Lattin, Corporations pp. 205-06, 225-27 (1959).
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contractual arrangement. It is a status relationship with accom-
panying unique juristic attributes. Universities seldom attempt in
a single document to define the consideration they tender in ex-
change for tuition, and to draft such an instrument would be an
enormous, likely impossible, task. Thousands of institutions and
hundreds of thousands of individuals enter into the student-uni-
versity arrangement each year without negotiating the terms
governing their relationship. Out of practical necessity, most
universities use a clerical staff to execute their end of the "bar-
gain." Instead of relying on the express terms of their agreement,
the parties entering into the student-university relationship under-
stand their arrangement by reference to the history and tradition
of the university's societal role. The arrangement which results
from a student's registration for a new semester can in fact be
traced in history well beyond America's entry into Western
civilization. Universal recognition of degrees from accredited
institutions throughout the nation is further evidence that the stu-
dent-university arrangement is a relationship of status, not a
mere contractual arrangement.
The student-university arrangement should therefore be rec-
ognized as a consensual relationship with certain commonly under-
stood, intrinsic characteristics which should be retained regardless
of the language contained in the registration form, the bursar's re-
ceipt or the school bulletin. It is an arrangement in which the
incidents of relationship overshadow the contractual verbiage
imposed upon the students.
B. The Fiduciary Status
The law of status is vast. To obtain guidance from the body
of existing law in deciding conflicts between parties in a student-
university relationship, it is necessary to narrow the scope of
inquiry to those parts of the law which bear the closest re-
semblance to this particular relationship. Our legal system has
evolved a set of rules governing the conduct of relationships
which require the finest sense of ethical behavior. This category
is the law of fiduciary relationships.
The term "fiduciary" is derived from the Latin fiduciarius,
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which in the Civil Law denotes one in a position of trust.112 The
concept entered the common law system through the courts of
equity." 3 In the Restatement of Agency, Second, a fiduciary is
defined as "a person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to
act primarily for the benefit of another in matters connected with
his undertaking."" 4 The Restatement of Torts gives a similar de-
finition." 5 It is generally held that the fiduciary relationship is
characterized by the "confidence subsisting between two part-
ies;"" 6 that if one party reasonably reposes confidence in the
fidelity and integrity of another, a fiduciary relation exists." 7
This reposing of confidence giving rise to the fiduciary status is
often evidenced by the making of confidential disclosures of a
moral, social, legal, domestic or personal nature." 8
112Vinter, Fiduciar. Relationship and Resulting Trusts at 1 (3rd ed. 1955);
Black, Law Dictionary 'fiduciary" (4th ed. 1951). The term "fiduciary" is often
used synonymously with the term "confidential". Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §
482 (Rev. ed. 1959). A useful distinction, however, is to designate as "con-
fidential" those relationships which obtain this attribute as a result of the peculiar
facts of the individual case; whereas "fiduciary" is the designation for those
relationships which are normally or characteristically of this nature.
Although many comprehensive works have been produced which analyze
the obligations of a fiduciary, I have not been able to uncover any satisfactory
comprehensive analysis of those characteristics which lead courts to conclude
that a fiduciary relationship exists. See, generally, Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships,
1962 Camb. L. J. 69. What follows is my own analysis of the common charac-
teristics of fiduciary status as revealed by the cases and commentators.
113 Mors v. Peterson, 261 IlM 532, 104 N.E. 216, 218 (1914); Story, Equity
Jurisprudence § 808 (3rd ed. 1842); Vinter, supra note 112, at 2, 10.
60 Restatement (Second), Agency § 13, comment a (1959), Haluka v. Baker,
60 Ohio App. 308, 34 N.E.2d 68, 70 (1941) (quoting with approval the
equivalent comment in Restatement, Agency); Scott, The Fiduciary Principle,
37 Calif. L. Rev. 539, 540 (1949). See also, Cranwell v. Oglesby, 299 Mass. 148,
12 N.E.2d 81 (1937) and Peckham v. Johnson, 98 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936).
115 "A fiduciary relation exists between two persons when one of them is
under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters
within the scope of the relation.. . . The liability is not solely dependent upon
an agreement or contractual relation . . . but results from the relation." Restate-
ment, Torts § 874, comments a, b (1939). Since the Restatement of Trust deals
solely with devices for property ownership and control, its definition of "fiduciary"
is too narrowly oriented to be of value to this discussion. Restatement (Second),
Trusts introduction at 1, § 2 comment b (1957).
16Commissioner v. Owens, 78 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1935); Vargas v. Esquire,
Inc., 166 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1948); Neagle v. McMullen, 334 IM. 168, 165 N.E.
608 (1929); Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929,
933 (1916); Roberts v. Parsons, 195 Ky. 274, 242 S.W. 594 (1922); 3 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence § 956 (5th ed. Symons 1941); Story Equity Jurisprudence
§ 308 (3d ed. 1842).
117 In re Cover's Estate, 188 Cal. 133, 204 Pac. 583, 588 (1922); Kerrigan
v. O'Meara, 71 Mont. 1, 227 Pac. 819, 821 (1924); Stoll v. King, 8 How. Pr.
298, 299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853).
118 Higgins v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 312 IMI. 11, 143 N.E. 482, 484
(1924); Mors v. Peterson, 261 Ill. 532, 104 N.E. 216, 218 (1914); Miranovitz v.
(Continued on next page)
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Even though actual confidence may be lacking, a fiduciary
relationship also exists where one party dominates another. 19 In
such situations, the bench presumes the presence of the requisite
confidence because of the function and nature of the position or
role which one person holds in relation to the other.
Although the courts are not in complete accord as to which
relationships involve characteristics which give rise to fiduciary
duties, among the recognized ones are: husband-wife, 120 guardian-
ward,121 attorney-client, 122 doctor-patient, 23 promoter-corpora-
tion,124 corporate director-shareholder, 25 administrator-heir, 2 8
trustee-beneficiary, 27 partner-co-partner 2s and clergyman-parish-
ioner.2 9 The list of relationships in which the court will find or
presume confidence is not frozen, however, and the law of fiduci-
ary extends to every case in which a confidential or dominating
relation exists in fact.130
The fiduciary concept is designed to carry out the reasonable
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Gee, 163 Wis. 246, 157 N.W. 790, 792 (1912); 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
§ 956 (5th ed. Symons, 1941).
119 E.g., Cranwell v. Oglesbky, 299 Mass. 148, 12 N.E.2d 81, 83 (1937)
(shareholders and directors and promoters; Roberts v. Parsons, 195 Ky. 274, 277,
242 S.W. 594, 596 (1922) (administrator and beneficiary); Higgins v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., supra note 118 (guardian and ward); Cowee and Comell, 75
N.Y. 91, 100 (1878) (guardian and ward). See, generally, e.g., Ballantine,
Corrations §§ 62, 63, 66 (Rev. ed. 1946); Bogert, Trusts & Trustees §§ 12-14,
16 (2d ed. 1965); Lattin, Corporations, pp. 205-06, 225-27 (1959); Scott, Trusts
§§ 378-82, 387-88, 404, 461-62 (1956).
20 In re Cover's Estate, 188 Cal. 133, 204 Pac. 583 (1922).
121 Higgins v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., supra note 118; Cowee v. Comell,
supra note 119; Bogert, supra note 119, at § 13.
12 2 Kukla v. Perry, 361 Mich. 311, 105 N.W.2d 176 (1960); In re Buder,
358 Mo. 796, 217 S.W.2d 563 (1949).
22 3 Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (D.C.N.D.
Ohio 1965); Zaremba v. Woods, 61 P.2d 976, 980 (Cal. App. 1936); Foster v.
Brady, 86 P.2d 760, 762 (Wash. 1939).
12 4 McCandless v. Furland, 296 U.S. 140 (1935); Cranwell v. Oglesby,
supra note 119; Bogert, supra note 119, at § 16.
128 Hill v. Bellevue Gardens, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1960), afd,
297 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Shlensky v. South Pkwy. Build. Corp., 19 M11. 2d
268 (1960); Cranwell v. Oglesby, supra note 119.
126 Roberts v. Parsons, supra note 119; Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 481 (2d
ed. 1959).
127 Bogert, supra note 119, at § 12; Scott, supra note 119.
'28 Bizzo v. Rizzo, 3 M11. 2d 291, 120 N.E.2d 546 (1954); Peckham v. John-
son, 98 S.W.2d 408, 412-13 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1936); Uniform Partnership
Act § 21; Bogert, supra note 119, at § 36.
129 Higgins v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., supra note 118.
lao Iid Mos v. Peterson, supra note 118; Beach. Modern Eqifity Jurisprud-
ence § 125 (1873); Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 956 at 793 (5th ed. Symons
1941); Vinter, Fiduciary Relationship and Resulting Trusts at 369 (3d ed. 1955).
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expectations of the parties. The law assumes that each person
normally looks out for his own interests in dealing with others,
but it acknowledges that such an assumption is inapplicable where
one party has placed his trust and confidence in the integrity and
fidelity of another or is placed at the mercy of another. The
fiduciary's dominance or influence gives him a high degree of
effective control over the entrusting or "dominated" party's
conduct. Actual inferiority or weakness of the entrusting party is
immaterial; the very nature of the relationship presupposes that
the fiduciary can succeed in exercising undue influence over him,
and this is sufficient reason to impose special standards of con-
duct on the fiduciary.' 31 Thus, a fiduciary's "power is at all times
subject to the equitable limitation that it may not be exercised
for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary
to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuiS."'132
Consequently, the judiciary scrutinizes with great care any
transaction between or among parties to a fiduciary relationship
since it wishes to keep the relation free from the taint of selfish
behavior.133 As Mr. Justice Cardozo once noted: "[Some] relations
in life . .. impose a duty to act in accordance with the highest
standards which a man of the most delicate conscience and the
nicest sense of honor might impose upon himself. In such cases,
to enforce adherence to those standards becomes the duty of the
judge.' 34 For this reason the courts hold that in a suit involving
the beneficiary, the fiduciary has the burden of proving the
validity of any transaction involving the subject matter of the
confidence. 35 The fiduciary also carries the burden of showing
that the transaction was fair, just, open and reasonable. 36 Finally,
the fiduciary must show that the confidence was not betrayed, that
he carried out his function conscientiously and in good faith and
1313 Pomeroy, supra note 130, at 789.
132 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); State ex rel. Harris v.
Gautier, 108 Fla. 390, 146 So. 562 (1933).
'33 Restatement, Contracts § 570 (1932); Corbin, Contracts, § 1456 (1951);
Bogert, supra note 126, at § 544; Vinter, supra note 130, at 9-10.
'34 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 108-110 (1921). See also,
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
135 Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 159 F. Supp. 104, 118-19
n.9 (W.D. La. 1958).
120 Pepper v. Litton, supra note 132; Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 166 F.2d 651,
652-53 (7th Cir. 1948); Finn v. Monk, 403 Ill. 167, 85 N.E.2d 701, 708 (1949);
Restatement, Contracts § 498 (1932); Story, Equity Jurisprudence § 311 (3d
ed. 1842); Williston, Contracts § 1625A (Rev. ed. 1937).
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that he has not obtained any undue advantage as a result of the
relationship.13 7
It is from increased dealings with each other that mankind
has been able to achieve material and social progress. The greater
reliance one can safely place in another's words and conduct the
more readily can one deal with others. It is to encourage such
beneficial reliance on the conduct of others that the courts hold
fiduciaries to the standard of conduct which the confiding party
reasonably expects from a person who has undertaken to act
primarily for the benefit of the entruster. With each success in
creating a normal standard of fiduciary conduct, in a particular
area of human relations, the law may look to further areas of
human intercourse in which application of the fiduciary concept
is required by the nature of the relationship. The law of fiduciary
is, therefore, expanding.138
C. The University as a Fiduciary
All of the elements of a fiduciary relation are present in the
student-university relationship. It is no small trust-no small dis-
play of confidence to place oneself under the educational mentor-
ship of a particular university. The value of an educational ex-
perience is directly affected by the school's conscientious, faithful
performance of its duties-duties which are directed toward the
student's benefit. The educator has the responsibility of setting
out tasks, the performance of which will presumably benefit the
student. The student performs these tasks in reliance upon the
educator's good faith performance of his duties as a teacher. In ad-
dition to often making confidential disclosures about his back-
ground, his health and his financial situation in applications for
admission and assistance, the student is expected to confide in
course and career counselors who are appointed by the uni-
versity. More important, in the examination process, a university
typically commands the student to disclose opinions on art, ye-
ligion, history, philosophy, political theory and the like, in order
137 Pepper v. Litton, supira note 132; Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood
Lumber Co., supra note 135; In re Cover's Estate, 188 Cal. 133, 204 Pac. 583,
588 (1922?; Neagle v. McMullen, 334 Mll. 168, 165 N.E. 605, -608 (1929); Ker-
rigan v. 0 Meara, 71 Mont. 1, 227 Pac. 819, 821 (1924); Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees § 543 (2d ed. 1959); Vinter, supra note 130, at 10; Williston, supra
note 136, at 4542.
138 Bogert, supra note 137, at § 481; Vinter, supra note 130, at 369.
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to discover the extent of his learning, ability and potential. In
making these disclosures, the student reposes confidence in the
school's skill and objectivity in evaluating, scoring and reporting
these manifestations of learning, ability and potential.
The university undertakes to select those who are competent
to teach and to establish for its students' benefit an atmosphere
conducive to intellectual development and to present a program of
studies and activities designed to expand and develop its students'
mental horizons. This is so whether a university is oriented to-
ward the liberal arts or toward awarding professional degrees.
These are the qualities they stress in their catalogues and at their
orientation lectures and alumni dinners.139
It is evident, therefore, that the student, of necessity, reposes
great confidence in the fidelity to duty and in the integrity of his
teachers and school administrators and that this confidence is an
absolute necessity for the effective operation of institutions of
higher learning. This reposing of confidence is that which is placed
in a fiduciary.1 40 It is very similar to that reposed in a doctor, a
lawyer, a clergymen or a corporate director.
In varying degrees, of course, some students do not place any
trust or confidence in their university. In some cases the student
regards his stay at an educational institution as a fruitless initia-
tion rite arbitrarily imposed by his culture or family. In other
cases the student is attending a school other than the one of his
preference and recognizes, or imagines, the presence of various
limitations in its staff's ability to give him the education he desires.
Even in such cases, however, the university is in a sufficient
position of dominance to give it all of the earmarks of a fiduc-
iary.141 It prescribes course work and programs and holds the
power of advancing the student, of disciplining him and of issuing
the desired degrees. Such dominance is similar to that which gives
rise to a fiduciary relation between the promoter and corporate
shareholder, director and shareholder, administrator and dis-
tributee, and trustee and beneficiary.
Whether because of the confidence which a student reposes in
the university or because of the dominance of the university over
139 Supra note 12.
140 Notes 116-18 and accompanying text, supra; Seavey, Dismissal of Stu-
(Continued on next page)
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the student and his destiny, the relationship between student and
university is a fiduciary relationship. As Professor Warren Seavey
has observed: "A fiduciary is one whose function it is to act for the
benefit of another as to matters relevant to the relation between
them. Since schools exist primarily for the education of their stu-
dents, it is obvious that professors and administrators act in a
fiduciary capacity with reference to the students."' 42
The fiduciary characterization is equally applicable to the
relationships between students and public universities and to
students and private universities. 143 An incidental benefit of using
the fiduciary concept in these cases is, of course, to rid the law of
a dual set of standards in student-university cases. Certainly the
private university, as a fiduciary, cannot engage in conduct bearing
any taint of unreasonableness, unfairness or arbitrariness which
might contrast with the public university's duties under both the
fourteenth amendment and its fiduciary role.
An obvious question at this point is why have the courts failed
to apply the law of fiduciary relations to student-university dis-
putes. One explanation is that lawyers have failed to pursue this
approach in analyzing these cases. Another explanation is that the
law in this area developed in large part during the last moments
of laissez faire jurisprudence-1900 to 1930--when courts were
particularly reluctant to look behind or tamper with the private
law of any relationship having an outwardly contractual appear-
ance. Since the 1920's, however, the bench has progressively
liberated itself from this inhibition when confronted with con-
flicts arising out of a relationship in which one of the parties was
bargaining on less than equal footing.44
Still another explanation for the failure of the judiciary to
deal with student-university conflicts as issues arising in the area
of fiduciary relations is that the necessity of a university education
as a requisite for reasonable economic opportunity has only in the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
dents: Due Process, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1406, 1407 n.3 (1957).
141 Supra note 119, and accompanying text:
142 Seavey, supra note 140.
143 A governmental agency may hold fiduciary status. E.g., Madison Town-
ship v. Dunle, 114 Ind. 262, 16 N.E. 593 (1888); Halliday -v. Norfolk & W.
Ry., 62 N.E.2d 716 (Ohio App. Ct. 1945).14 4 See, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 315 U.S. 289 (1942); Fried-
man, Changing Functions of Contract in Common Law, 9 U. Toronto L.J. 15
(1951).
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past ten or fifteen years come to parallel such other socially
recognized needs as medical services for physical well-being; at-
torney's service for legal well-being; or religious counselling for
spiritual well-being. And, much as the law of fiduciary protects
the patient, the client or the parishioner from the superior
bargaining position of the medical, legal or religious expert into
whose hands he has entrusted the care of his well-being, it must
now recognize the need to give similar protection to the student.
Given the proposition that there is a fiduciary relationship
between student and university, it becomes apparent that, con-
trary to past practice, the courts have a positive duty to scrutinize
carefully any action which might blemish the high standard of
conscience and honor which should govern the conduct of a
fiduciary (the university) in dealing with entrusters (its stu-
dents). Consistent with the usual rule of fiduciary relations, the
institution, not the student, should carry the evidentiary burden
of proving the fiduciary quality of its conduct.145 Since the school's
central role, by dedication, declaration and tradition, is to be a
citadel of free inquiry in the disciplined but unfettered search for
truth, any examination of its conduct should be posed in terms of
its fidelity to that function. Similarly, as a fiduciary, the univer-
sity has the burden of establishing that it acted in a just and
reasonable manner toward its students. 146 Moreover, as a fiduciary,
it must disclose fully all relevant facts in any transaction with the
student.147
In sum, the university, like any fiduciary, and not the student,
should have the burden of demonstrating that any disciplinary
action: (a) was reasonably imposed for cause consistent with its
function of maintaining an open-minded atmosphere conducive
to the acquisition and use of tools for freely inquiring into and
.exploring ideas;. and (b) 'was imposed in a manner consistent
with scholarly integrity and fair process. In addition, as a fiduciary,
the university ought to afford the student every opportunity and
means of rehabilitation.148 On the other hand, the university's
fiduciary responsibility should not extend beyond those activities
145 Notes 133-135, supra and accompanying text.
146 Ibid. Included in this duty is the need to shape the system of sanctions
to the gravity of the wrong. See Linde, supra note 17 at 40, 53 n.27.
147 Ibid.
148 Seavey, supra note 140, at 1410.
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in which it acts in a fiduciary capacity with relation to the
students.
D. Resolving the University's Conflicting Fiduciary Duties
Recognizing the university's status as a fiduciary to its students
should do much to protect student liberty and to safeguard stu-
dents from the imposition of arbitrary and excessive punishment.
It should accomplish this by shifting the burden of proof and
persuasion from the student to the school. Further, it should help
to focus the court's attention on the responsibilities and nature of
the university's proper role in our society and encourage the
bench to decide these cases in light of that role. But this does not
mean that students will prevail whenever they come into conflict
with a university, or that universities will be unable to regulate
student conduct. For example, the duty owed by the university to
protect the safety of its students as a communal group may
justify upholding the university's action in a case involving a
student who has disrupted the decorum of a class or a campus
meeting.
Also, the university's duty to its students may, from time to
time, conflict with a duty it owes to some other group. Whether
and when such duties are cause for upholding the university's
exercise of disciplinary sanctions can only be decided on a case
by case basis. However, since the basic service of the university to
almost every group it serves is dependent upon the preservation
of the university as a sanctuary for the free exchange of ideas,
conflicts arising out of competition for its fidelity should be few.
Nor is the resolution of conflicting claims to a single fiduciary's
fidelity a novel problem for the courts. For example, when there
are two or more successive beneficiaries to a trust, the interests of
the respective beneficiaries are to a certain extent antagonistic
and the trustee is under a duty to preserve a fair balance between
his duty to all.149
Obviously, in applying the fiduciary standard to university
disciplinary actions, the courts must take into account any
special circumstances surrounding the controversy. A reasonable
ground for expelling a seminary student may well be abmurd if
149 E.g., Hardy v. Hardy, 217 Ark. 305, 230 S.W.2d 11 (1950); Johnson v.
Johnson, 242 Iowa 27, 45 N.W.2d 573 (1951).
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used as the basis for disciplining a fine arts or law student.
A particularly difficult question concerning the significance of sur-
rounding circumstances occurs when a dispute arises regarding
the degree to which a denominational university should be able
to require students of the faith to adhere to the religious tenets
of the school's sponsors.150
To help understand the impact of treating the university as a
fiduciary, we can explore a few possible assertions of conflicting
fiduciary duties which may, from time to time, have to be resolved
in deciding these cases.
1. Duty to the Community.-Universities often assert that
they owe to the community at large a duty to act for the benefit
of the general welfare, both because the community helps to fi-
nance the school, whether public or private, and because the uni-
versity is dedicated to the purpose of acting as a public servant. Ac-
cordingly, university officials may argue, as they have on occasion,
that if a student engages in conduct, even off-campus, which is un-
lawful or violative of the community's mores, the school ought to
impose disciplinary sanctions. 151
The errors in this rationale are several. For one thing, if the
university owes a duty to the community, the nature of that duty
is for the school to function as a university, not as a police court,
legislature or board of censors. Therefore, in order to justify its
disciplinary action on the grounds that it is fulfilling its duty to
the community, the university should be required to demonstrate
that its exercise of disciplinary powers constitutes conduct neces-
sary and proper to the process of providing higher education.152
Further, the power to invoke punishment in our society
resides exclusively with the state, and more particularly with the
judicial branch. Indeed courts will not enforce civil claims which
the judiciary finds are based upon a private, punitive scheme. 53
150 See, Carr v. St. John's Univ., 12 N.Y.2d 802, affirming, 17 App. Div. 2d 632
(1962); Note, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 983, 1019-20 (1963); Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1164 (1962); Comment, 8 S.D.L. Rev. 177 (1963).151 See, e.g., Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla.,
1963); Van Woodward, The Unreported Crisis in Southern Co!eges, Harpers
Magazine, Oct. 1962, pp. 82, 84.
152 Notes 145-148, supra, and accompanying texts. Also, Sherry, Governance
of the University, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 23, 29-30 (1966).
'53 E.g., H. J. McGrath Co. v. Wisner, 189 Md. 260, 55 A.2d 793 (1947);
Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920).
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For the university to thrust itself into the role of the state as the
vehicle for imposing sanctions is for it to subvert, not aid, the
public welfare.
Moreover, even if we presume that the university has a duty
to use its authority to foster community mores and law enforce-
ment, it does not follow that this will excuse it from conforming
to fiduciary standards in dealing with its students. By constitu-
tional mandate, as well as under the common law concept of
natural justice, we require government agencies to adhere to
exacting standards of fair procedure in the course of enforcing
law. This requirement is tantamount to a communal judgment
that disregard of fair procedure in law enforcement is not in the
public interest. In addition, certain forms of public regulation of
conduct are proscribed by constitutional fiat, especially in the area
of speech and association. This proscription is tantamount to a
communal judgment that regulation of such activities is not in
the public interest. Therefore, if the educational institution is
acting in furtherance of the public welfare, it stands to reason
that it should be limited in the mode and substance of its regula-
tions by the same standards which confine governmental regula-
tion. Otherwise, the university's conduct in the name of the com-
munity violates the community's own definition of its self-in-
terest.154
2. Protecting the School's "Good Name." - The need to pro-
tect the interests of students, alumni and faculty in the "good
name" of the university is frequently asserted as justification for
a school's action in restricting the social or political liberty of its
students. Of course, as a fiduciary or agent of a fiduciary, neither
the university nor its faculty may place personal interests above
those of the entruster. 155 To assert that disciplinary action is justi-
fied by the school's need to protect its reputation is to violate this
cardinal rule of fiduciary conduct. Thus, in the same way that a
lawyer should not refuse to defend 1 6 an infamous client in order
to avoid community disapprobation, so too a university should
not exercise its disciplinary power because the student conduct
154 Supra notes 15-20, and accompanying texts.
155 Supra notes 133 and 137.156 See, Downs & Goldman, The Obligation of Lawyers to Represent Un-
popular Defendants, 9 How. L.J. 49 (1963).
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in question is unpopular in the community.
Further, whenever a group of faculty members, students or
alumni cry out that the university's good name is being injured
by the conduct of some students, another group of faculty mem-
bers, students or alumni will frequently cry out with equal volume
that this same conduct is enhancing the school's reputation.
Certainly, the gravest danger which threatens a university's good
name with that portion of the community to whom the doctrine
of academic freedom is sacred arises when the university excer-
cises its power autocratically or in suppression of freedom of as-
sociation or expression.157
Finally, as noted above,158 the university has a sizeable arsenal
with which to protect itself, its faculty, and its alumni from any
harm to its reputation which might be caused by the words or
actions of students. And, of course, the university, like any other
institution, may protect itself or obtain relief from the purported
harm wrought by any wrongful activity of its students through
the usual channels for obtaining civil and criminal remedies.
3. Protecting the Integrity of the Educational Processes.-Al-
though, as a fiduciary, the university should not attempt to justify
the exercise of its disciplinary powers for the purpose of pro-
tecting its "good name," it can justify use of its disciplinary
powers for the purpose of protecting the integrity of the methods
by which it performs its services to its students and the public.
Thus, just as the lawyer may threaten, or act upon a threat, to
refuse to serve a client who seeks to implicate the attorney in an
unsavory scheme, a university should be able to discipline i stiu-
dent who disrupts the decorum of the classroom or who, without
authorization, purports to speak in the school's name. And, just is
a physician may threaten, or act upon a threat, to cease ministeiing
to a patient who does not follow the doctor's orders, so may a
university discipline a student who plagiarizes or cheats on an
examination.
The reason the university, like the physician or lawyer, should
157 See, e.g., summary of public reaction to speaker's ban on the campuses
of the New York City University. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1961, p. 1, col. 7.15sSupra pp. 650-54. See also, Linde, Campus Law, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 40,
59-60 (1960), describing the experience of University of Oregon under similar
circumstances.
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be able to protect itself in these situations is that there are no
civil remedies available to otherwise. protect it from this action
which threatens it with injury. For example, although a physi-
cian's professional time may be wasted and his reputation threat-
ened when a patient disregards his advice, the law provides him
with no remedy. Therefore, because the problem at hand
threatens to undermine essential elements of the doctor-patient
relationship-the patient's respect for his doctor's advice and the
doctor's reasonable anticipation that the patient will follow that
advice-the physician may act in a manner which is arguably
contrary to the patient's best interests. Likewise, a lawyer may,
and indeed must, refuse to advise a client concerning the tech-
niques for engaging in activities which are extra-legal because as
an officer of the court and a party to communications which are
sanctified by our legal system, he is duty-bound to counsel only
conduct within the letter and spirit of the law. His duty to his
client does not include the doing of unlawful acts. And, there
is no legal remedy against the client for the taint or penalties
caused to the lawyer and his profession by his being made a party
to the client's unlawful conduct.
Similarly, the university may turn to the law of torts or crimes
to prevent and to remedy the damage threatened or caused by
the student who destroys library books, upsets furniture or who
pedals narcotics to his classmates. But since there is no cause of
action to remedy the undermining of the grading system or the
disruption of classroom decorum, the university's duty to the stu-
dent need not and should not encompass tolerance of such action.
4. Duty to the Student's Parents.-As discussed above, 59 the
university's relationship with its students does not come within
the legal concept of loco parentis. But, even though it does not
stand in the place of the parent, exercise of the university's disci-
plinary power may, on occasion, be rationalized as necessary to
fulfill a duty owed by it to a student's parents. Analysis quickly
reveals, however, that the extent to which this rationale is avail-
able is very limited.
In many cases there is no direct relationship between the
university and the parents of the student. At most, wvhere there
159 Supra pp. 650-51.
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is some direct contact, it is usually merely to get the parents to
assume certain financial obligations. The school rarely makes any
promises to them and generally does not communicate with them
concerning its programs or facilities.
In the case of a large portion of the student body, emancipation
or majority status has liberated them from parental control.16°
Hence the university can hardly look to any duty it owes to the
parent for justification of its own actions when the parent has no
special legal interest in, or power over, the student's conduct.
As with any delegation of authority, if the university is a
delegate of the parents, it should be restricted to exercising only
that authority which the parents might reasonably anticipate it
would exercise in fulfilling the duty it owes to them. If, as often
happens,161 the student's parents join in a protest against disci-
plinary action, a question is obviously raised as to any claim that
the university is carrying out a duty to the parents. More im-
portant, it is reasonable to presume that in delegating authority
over their child, a student's parents would expect the disciplinarian
to give the child a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate his in-
nocence and would try to measure the rigor of its punishment
by the severity of the wrong. This, of course, is consistent with
the school's responsibility as a fiduciary. Finally, it should be
recognized that most situations in which a school can assert that
it owes a duty to the student's parents, such as regulating hours of
ingress and egress from a dormitory, the conduct involved falls
outside of the educational process. In such cases the school does
not bear the obligations of a fiduciary, nor should it be allowed to
take advantage of its fiduciary capacity to aid itself in serving some
other role.
E. Nonfiduciary Activities
Not every contact between a university and its students will be
in a fiduciary capacity. When a university provides services to its
students beyond those essential to receiving a university education,
it should be able to deal as a nonfiduciary. On the other hand, it
should not be permitted to stand in a better position with respect
160 Supra note 35.
161 .E.g., Steier v. New York State Educ. Connm'r., 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.
1959); United States ex rel. Gannon v. Georgetown College 28 App. D.C. 87(1906).
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to the students than would some other party in that same role
since this would constitute an improper use of fiduciary power.16 2
For example, when a university provides dormitory facilities,
the contacts it has with its students with respect to the use of
such facilities should be judged under the law of landlord and
tenant. Since the student can live elsewhere and still attend the
university, there is no reason to impose fiduciary duties upon
the university when it acts in the capacity of a landlord; that is,
unless as a landlord it owes fidiciary duties. And, there is no
reason why the university should be permitted to utilize its
fiduciary role as an educator in order to give itself greater control
over its tenants than a landlord would normally possess. If it wants
to regulate the hours of ingress and egress to its building, or the
noise level, or the like, it should be allowed to do so. If a tenant
violates those rules, the school, as landlord, should have the
usual remedies of damages and eviction. There is no justification,
however, for allowing the added remedy of academic expulsion
or other disciplinary action. This is inconsistent with the school's
fiduciary duty to place the student's interests above its own.
In cases where residence in a university dormitory is a pre-
requisite to university attendance and is part of the university's
educational design, then, of course, a university would be a
fiduciary in its role as landlord.
V. CONCLUSION
The vitality of our free institutions and the vigor of our
economic health depend in large measure on the effectiveness of
our universities. Responsibility for preserving an academic at-
mosphere of free expression and association and fair process falls
primarily upon university administrators and faculties.163 If these
persons fail to properly discharge their trust, however, the courts
can and must preserve the environment of freedom and integrity
upon which students, teachers and the community rely for the full
162 Supra notes 133-37.163 Meritorious techniques for coping with this responsibility are discussed
in: Linde, Campus Law, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 40 (1966); Heyman, Some Thoughts
on University Disciplinary Proceedings, id, at 73, 78-86; AAUP, Tentative State-
ment on the Academic Freedom of Students, 51 A.A.U.P. Bull. 447 (1966);
ACLU, Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges and Uni-
versities (Rev. ed. 1963).
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utilization of opportunities for education, inquiry and discovery.
Adjudication of student-university conflicts as controversies in-
volving the conduct of an institution operating in a fiduciary
status will, it is hoped, bring greater assurance that when courts
decide these cases they will do so in a manner consistent with the
university's role as an exemplar of openmindedness and a sanc-
tuary of liberty.
